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1 Introduction
Together with the increased importance of tariffs as a commercial policy
in international trade arrangements (e.g., the Uruguay GATT round), the
last fifteen years have witnessed the reexamination of the macroeconomic
effects of tariffs using modern dynamic optimizing models. The first and still
most important contribution is Razin and Svensson (1983). Using a two-
period model, they show how a permanent rise in tariffs affects savings and
the current account by changing the interest rate in the utility terms if the
present subutility function differs from the future one. With the resultant
preference-shift, a permanent tariff affects the price indices differently for
present and future expenditures, changes the real interest rate, and thereby
influences savings through a substitution effect.1
Their seminal work stimulated many subsequent studies,2 though it re-
lies on some restrictive assumptions. First of all, by using exogenous time-
varying subutility functions, the preference-shifting is incorporated in the
form of an externality to consumers.3 A more natural and reasonable model-
ing would entail endogenous preference-shifting. Secondly, as Svensson and
Razin (1983) show using a two-period framework, a change in the terms of
trade affects savings through (i) a substitution effect, due to compensated
demand shifts, and (ii) a welfare effect, owing to changes in welfare. How-
ever, Razin and Svensson (1983) assume that preferences are homothetically
separable over time, thereby implicitly neglecting a welfare effect.
To ease the restrictions, we incorporate a type of preference nonsepa-
rability to examine the effects of a permanent change in tariffs for a small
country model. By extending the familiar time-preference model, à la Uzawa
(1968) and Epstein and Hynes (1983), consumer preferences are specified as
weakly nonseparable, in the sense that the intratemporal marginal rate of
substitution between two goods, imported and exported goods, depends on
1In the case of a temporary rise in tariffs, it always raises the real interest rate, increases
saving, and hence improves the current account even if the subutility function is time-
invariant. See Razin and Svensson (1983).
2For example, Van Wijnbergen (1987) focuses on a real wage rigidity to derive the
effects of permanent and temporary tariffs which are distinct from what Svensson and
Razin obtain. O’Rourke (1989) argues that a permanent tariff reduction worsens the
current account under a short-run sectoral immobility of capital. Ostry (1990) shows that
in the presence of initial tariffs, temporary tariffs can worsen the current account through
a temporary income reduction which is magnified by the initial distortion.
3For detailed discussions, see also Svensson and Razin (1983), particularly p.108.
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future consumption through current welfare. Relative preferences toward the
two goods then depend on current welfare and hence on current wealth. Put
otherwise, when wealth increases, preferences toward one good can be more
or less enhanced than those toward the other good. With the preference
structure, a permanent rise in import tariffs induces a change in steady-state
welfare and wealth so as to make preferences shift away from imports in fa-
vor of exports. The current account must adjust in the interim run to bring
about the steady-state welfare change. Our main interest is to focus on this
channel which is neglected in the literature. The resultant current-account
adjustment is generated by endogenous preference shifts.
Weakly nonseparable preferences are considered in endogenous time pref-
erence models by Lucas and Stokey (1984), Judd (1985), Epstein, Ham, and
Zin (1988), Shi (1994), and Ikeda (2000a, b). Shi (1994) conducts the most
systematic analysis on this topic. He characterizes the consumption-leisure
choice under weakly nonseparable preferences to discuss implications of dis-
tortionary taxation on capital and/or labor. His key finding is that even a
marginal tax can affect steady-state welfare. Our idea is to apply this prop-
erty to the analysis of tariffs in a two-commodity framework. My companion
paper (Ikeda (2000a)) examines the effect of a terms-of-trade deterioration
using a model similar to the one in this paper. In contrast to the literature
(e.g., Obstfeld (1982)), it shows that the Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect
can occur even with increasing impatience. It will turn out that weakly
nonseparable preferences make more difference when they are applied to the
analysis of tariffs, especially the effect of a marginal increase in tariffs without
initial distortion.
Based on the usual assumption that the degree of impatience measured
by time preference is increasing in current wealth, we first show that a per-
manent rise in tariffs raises or lowers steady-state welfare, depending on
whether preferences toward exports are more or less wealth-enhanced than
those toward imports. As in Svensson and Razin (1983), the effect on the
current account is decomposed into two, possibly offsetting effects: (i) a sub-
stitution effect and (ii) a welfare effect. (i) has a first-order magnitude only
with initial distortion and is positive, whereas (ii) has a first-order negative
(positive) effect even without initial tariffs when preferences toward imported
goods are more (less) wealth-enhanced than toward exports. This property is
in sharp contrast to what Razin and Svensson (1983) obtain: in their model
a marginal tariff without initial distortion can have a first-order substitution
effect but no welfare effect. We will clarify how their result depends on the
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two restrictive assumptions we pointed out at the outset. Nevertheless, the
working of our model will turn out to be economically very similar to that
of Razin and Svensson’s model: in both of the models, a permanent tariff
without initial distortion improves (deteriorates) the current account only
when relative preferences toward imports are, endogenously or exogenously,
weakened (enhanced) in the future (i.e., in the new steady state), in which
case the import tariff makes present goods more (less) expensive than future
ones. Our contribution lies in that the result here is obtained by focusing
on a welfare effect in an infinite-horizon model with endogenous preference
shifting.
The Uzawa-type time-preference is sometimes criticized for its unappeal-
ing feature that the property of dynamics depends crucially on the assump-
tion of increasing impatience (e.g., Svensson and Razin (1983) and Mansoo-
rian (1993)). To address this issue, we also examine the case of decreasing
impatience, showing that the assumption in this regard does not play such
a crucial role under weakly nonseparable preferences. In particular, without
initial distortion, the sign of the effect on the current account depends solely
on whether preferences toward exports are more or less wealth-enhanced than
toward imports, but not on whether impatience is increasing or decreasing
in wealth, i.e., not on whether preferences toward present goods are more or
less wealth-enhanced than toward future goods.
There are a couple of studies which have incorporated intertemporally
dependent preferences to analyze the effect of permanent tariffs. By the
straightforward application of Uzawa’s time-preference model, Engel and
Kletzer (1986) show that a first-order distortion caused by a tariff leads
to an improvement in the current account. Mansoorian (1993) emphasizes
habit persistence as an important determinant of the effect of permanent
tariffs. Our study can be differentiated from these studies in several points.
First of all, they invariably assume identically weakly separable preferences,
excluding implicitly a welfare effect which we emphasize. Secondly, their ar-
guments are limited to the case of non-marginal tariffs. In our model, even
marginal tariffs without initial tariffs always have a first-order (welfare) effect
on saving. Thirdly, a permanent tariff here can increase steady-state welfare,
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whereas in their model tariffs harm it.4,5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our
analytical framework and derives the equilibrium dynamics. In section 3,
the effects of a permanent increase in tariffs are examined. In section 4, the
case of decreasing impatience is examined. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The analytical framework
2.1 The model
Consider a small open economy populated with infinitely-lived identical agents.
They consume domestic goods d and foreign goods f . The economy is en-
dowed with constant units y of the domestic good and nothing of the foreign
good at each instant. All the foreign-good consumption f is thus imported
from abroad. By the small-country assumption, the relative price p of the for-
eign good in terms of the domestic one is exogenously given. An import tariff
τ is levied on consumption f .6 The government just refunds the tariff rev-
enue to consumers in the lump-sum manner. The representative agent holds
non-human wealth in the form of bonds b. Bonds can be either purchased or
issued freely at a constant interest rate r in the international market.
Consumers’ preferences are characterized by endogenous utility-discounting
and weak nonseparability. Their lifetime utility U is specified as:
U (0) =
Z ∞
0
u(d (t) , f (t)) exp
µ
−
Z t
0
θ (d (s) , f (s)) ds
¶
dt, (1)
4As in these existing models focusing on consumer preferences, we assume away any
supply-side adjustments. For this point, see Sen and Turnovsky (1989), Gavin (1991) and
Turnovsky (1991). See also Engel and Kletzer (1990), in which an overlapping-generations
model is developed to examine the effect of a tariff through intergenerational redistribution
of income that is caused by factor-price changes and by the distribution of tariff revenue.
5Surprisingly, empirical research on the current-account effects of tariffs is very few
and the result is controversial. For example, Dornbusch (1987) reports that it is positive,
whereas Ostry and Rose (1992) show that tariff changes have no significant effects on
macroeconomic variables such as the real trade balance. See also Backus et al. (1994),
which report that signs of correlation between the terms of trade and the trade account
differ internationally.
6A part of domestic-good consumption d may also be imported if the representative
agent holds positive net foreign assets. Throughout the paper, however, we restrict our
attention to import tariffs which are imposed only on f .
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where u (·, ·) represents a felicity function and where θ (·, ·) > 0 is a discount-
ing function. We assume:
θd, θf = 0 and θd + θf > 0,
where θd = ∂θ/∂d, etc. This assumption implies increasing marginal impa-
tience in the sense that time preferences are increasing in current welfare.7
When we define the generating function g as
g (d, f,φ) = u (d, f)− φθ (d, f) , (2)
where φ (t) represents the lifetime utility U (t) from the consumption stream
after time t, g generates φ by the law of motion,
φ˙ = −g (d, f,φ) s.t. lim
t→∞
φ (t) exp
µ
−
Z t
0
θ (d (s) , f (s)) ds
¶
= 0,
where a dot represents the time derivative. Note that gd and gf equal the
current-value marginal utilities of d (t) and f (t) respectively, defined in terms
of the Voltera derivative. We assume gd > 0 and gf > 0. The marginal rate
of substitution between d (t) and f (t) is then given by the ratio of gf and
gd, i.e., dd (t) /df (t)|U(0)=const. = (gf/gd) (d (t) , f (t) ,φ (t)). The preferences
are weakly nonseparable if gf (t) /gd (t) really depends on φ (t) and hence on
the consumption stream after t.
To characterize weak nonseparability, we follow Shi (1993) in introducing
a nonseparability index ξ as
ξ (d, f,φ) ≡ 1
gf/gd
∂ (gf/gd)
∂φ =
θd
gd
− θf
gf
.
By definition, the weak nonseparability of preferences is captured by a nonzero
ξ and weak separability by ξ = 0.8 A positive (negative) ξ implies that a rise
in lifetime utility shifts preferences away from consumption d to f (f to
d). When ξ >(<)0, preferences toward foreign goods f are referred to as
more (less) wealth-enhanced than those toward d. For an alternative inter-
pretation, the index can be rewritten as ξ (d, f,φ) = θdθf
gdgf
³
uf
θf −
ud
θd
´
. With
7See Lucas and Stokey (1984). This implication will be seen explicitly in (10) below.
8For example, consider three cases: (i) θ is constant (time-additive preferences); (ii) u
is constant (e.g., Epstein and Hynes (1983)); and (iii) θ is a transform of u (e.g., Uzawa
(1968)). In these cases, in which preferences are weakly separable, ξ indeed equals zero.
Tariffs under Weakly Nonseparable Preferences 6
a positive (negative) ξ, therefore, the relative elasticities of u to θ with re-
spect to f are larger (smaller) than those with respect to d. As shown later,
under weakly nonseparable preferences, such a discrepancy in the relative
elasticities allows a change in tariffs to affect steady-state welfare u/θ.
As for the second-order derivatives of g, we assume: gdf = 0 and
gdd < 0, gff < 0,
θgdd
g2d
< ξ < −θgff
g2f
. (3)
Inequality (3) ensures the local concavity of consumers’ preferences.9
Consumers maximize lifetime utility (1) subject to: (i) the flow budget
constraint,
b˙ (t) = rb (t) + y − d (t)− (p+ τ (t)) f (t) + x (t) , (4)
where x represents a lump-sum transfer from the government; (ii) the initial
condition, b0 =given; and (iii) the no-Ponzi game condition, lim
t→∞
exp (−rt) b (t) ≥
0. Letting λ denote the current-value shadow price of savings, the first-order
conditions are given by:
gd (d,φ) (≡ ud (d, f)− φθd (d, f)) = λ, (5)
gf (f,φ)
gd (d,φ)
= p+ τ, (6)
λ˙ = (θ (d, f)− r)λ, (7)
φ˙ = −g (d, f,φ) . (8)
To eliminate λ from the Euler condition (7), define the rate of time pref-
erence ρd with respect to d as ρd = −d lnΩd (t) /dt
¯¯
d˙=0
, where Ωd (t) ≡
gd (d (t) ,φ (t)) exp
³
−
R t
0
θ (d (s) , f (s)) ds
´
represents the present-value mar-
ginal utility of d. Then, from (5), (7) can be rewritten as
d˙ = − gd
gdd
¡
r − ρd (d, f,φ)
¢
, (9)
where
ρd (d, f,φ) = θ (d, f)− θd (d, f)
gd (d,φ)
g (d, f,φ) . (10)
9See Shi (1994) for the proof. The assumption that gdf = 0 is made just for brevity.
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The rate of time preference ρf with respect to f can also be defined in the
same manner. From (8) and (10), in the steady state, the rates of time
preference equal the discount rate θ.
The government follows the balanced-budget principle:
τ (t) f (t) = x (t) .
Throughout the paper the government is assumed to keep the time path of
τ (t) flat after the initial point in time. Given an endogenously-determined
f (t), x (t) is determined to satisfy this equation. Combining the budget equa-
tion for the government with consumers’ one yields the balance of payment
equation,
b˙ (t) = rb (t) + y − d (t)− pf (t) . (11)
2.2 Equilibrium dynamics
Given the initial bond stock, the equilibrium dynamics for (b, d, f,φ) are
completely described by (8), (6), (9), (11), and the no-Ponzi game condition.
The steady-state equilibrium, (b∗, d∗, f ∗,φ∗), is determined by the following
equations:¡
ρd (d∗, f ∗,φ∗) =
¢
θ (d∗, f∗) = r, (12)
φ∗ = u (d∗, f ∗) /r, (13)
gf (f
∗, u (d∗, f ∗) /θ (d∗, f ∗))
gd (d∗, u (d∗, f∗) /θ (d∗, f∗))
= p+ τ, (14)
rb∗ = d∗ + pf∗ − y. (15)
In the above, (12) represents d˙ = 0 where (10) and g∗ = 0 are substituted
successively into (9). (13) comes from (2) and (12) with g∗ = 0. (14) is
obtained by substituting (12) and (13) into (6). (15) represents b˙ = 0 (see
(11)).
(12) and (14) jointly determine d∗ and f ∗. φ∗ and b∗ are then given
by (13) and (15), respectively. Figure 1 illustrates the determination of
the steady-state equilibrium. Schedules RR0 and FF 0 represent (12) and
(14), respectively: RR0 represents the locus of (d∗, f∗) which equalizes the
steady-state rate of time preference to the world interest rate; and FF 0 is the
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locus along which the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution equals the
tariff-adjusted relative price. The RR0-schedule, say the steady-state time
preference curve, necessarily has a negative slope, whereas the slope of FF 0
can be of either sign. The figure depicts a normal case in which FF 0 is
positively sloping. The steady-state consumption (d∗, f∗) is determined at
the intersection point E of schedules RR0 and FF 0. Given this, the external
balance condition (15) is depicted as schedule BB0, which goes through point
E with slope −1/p. Its horizontal intercept, point B, represents rb∗ + y and
hence gives the steady-state bond stock b∗.
We can depict the effect of an initial tariff τ by using a line segment
TT 0 going through point E with slope −1/ (p+ τ). From (14), schedule TT 0
can be regarded as the linear approximation of the steady-state indifference
curve around point E: {(d∗, f∗) | u (d∗, f∗) /θ (d∗, f∗) = utility at E}. The
slope of the schedule, −1/ (p+ τ ) (= −gd/gf from (14)), is smaller or larger
in magnitude than the gradient at point E of schedule RR0, i.e., −θd/θf , as ξ
is positive or negative. In figure 1, ξ is assumed to be positive. Note also that
the gradient of curve RR0 at point E is assumed to be larger in magnitude
than 1/p, the slope of the external balance line BB0. It will be shown later
that the relative magnitudes of the gradients of three schedules RR0, TT 0,
and BB0, determine the signs of the effects of a tariff change on φ∗ and b∗.
To obtain the local dynamic system for X ≡ (d,φ, b), solve (6) for f ,
which can be substituted into (8), (9), and (11). By linearizing the resulting
system around the steady state, we have X˙ (t) = AXˆ (t) ;
A ≡


− ξg
2
f
gff
gd
gdd
³
g2f ξ2
gff
+ rθd
gd
´
0
−gd
n
1 + (p+ τ)2 gdd
gff
o
r +
ξg2f
gff
0
−1− p (p+ τ ) gdd
gff
p
ξgf
gff
r

 , (16)
where the hats placed above the variables denote deviations from their steady-
state values, e.g., dˆ (t) = d (t)− d∗.
We can show that the linear system has two positive and one negative
roots, with the negative one being given by
ω ≡
r −
r
r2 +
4g2dg
2
f
gddgff
Ψ
2
,
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where
Ψ = −
½
ξ2 + rθdθf
gdgf
µ
gdd
θdgd
+
gff
θfgf
¶¾
, (17)
which can be shown to be positive under increasing impatience and (3) (see
appendix A for the proof). It follows that the relevant dynamic system
exhibits saddle point stability.
The resultant saddle trajectories can be derived from the eigen vectors
associated with (16) as
b˙ (t) = ωbˆ (t) , bˆ (0) = b0 − b∗, (18)
dˆ (t) =
(r − ω) g2f
gff∆
Ã
ξ + gff (r − ω)
g2f
!
bˆ (t) , (19)
fˆ (t) =
(r − ω) gfgd
gff∆
µ
gdd (r − ω)
g2d
− ξ
¶
bˆ (t) , (20)
φˆ (t) = (r − ω) gd∆
½
1 + (p+ τ)2 gdd
gff
¾
bˆ (t) , (21)
where
∆ =
g2f
gff
"
ξ + gff (r − ω)
g2f
+
p
p+ τ
½
gdd (r − ω)
g2d
− ξ
¾#
,
which is positive under the concavity assumption (3).
(18) gives monotonic dynamics for state variable b. Given the dynamics,
transitional paths for d, f , and φ are determined on stable arms (19), (20),
and (21), respectively. With (3), the saddle trajectories are all positively-
sloping, implying that both consumption goods are normal. In figure 1, the
stable arm for
³
dˆ, fˆ
´
obtained from (19) and (20) is depicted by a positively-
sloping schedule SS0. This could be regarded as the Engel-curve.
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3 The effect of a permanent increase in tariffs
Let us examine the effects of an unanticipated, permanent increase in the
tariff τ at the initial point in time, t = 0.10 Since the equilibrium dynamics
along the saddle trajectory are monotonic, the sign of the current-account
effect in the short run is the same as that of the steady-state effect on net
foreign assets.
Formally the steady-state effect of a permanent rise in τ can be derived
from (12) through (15) as
dd∗
dτ =
rθf
g2fΨ
> 0, (22)
df ∗
dτ = −
rθd
g2fΨ
< 0, (23)
dφ∗
dτ = −
ξ
Ψ (p+ τ ) T 0 as ξ S 0, (24)
db∗
dτ =
p
gfΨ (p+ τ )
µ
τθf
pgf
− ξ
¶
T 0 as τθf
pgf
T ξ. (25)
(22) and (23) reveal that an increase in τ shifts consumption from f ∗ to
d∗. From (24), the effect on φ∗ can be either positive or negative according
to whether d is more or less wealth-enhanced than f . This is because when
ξ <(>)0, i.e., when preferences toward d are more (less) wealth-enhanced
than those toward f , the relative elasticities of u to θ with respect to d are
larger (smaller) than those with respect to f . Given that any changes in
(d∗, f∗) should take place to keep θ equal to r, the positive effect of the in-
crease in d∗ given by (22) on u∗/θ∗ dominates (is dominated by) the negative
effect of the decrease in f∗ shown by (23). Intuitively, in the long run, wel-
fare adjusts so as to promote consumption substitution from f ∗ to d∗: when
preferences toward d∗ are more (less) wealth- and hence welfare-enhanced
than toward f ∗, steady-state welfare increases (decreases) to enhance the
preferences toward d∗.
10Recent empirical studies report that average tariff-rates contain unit roots in many
countries (e.g., Gardner and Kimbrough (1989), Gardner, Slottje, and Kimbrough (1992),
and Bohara and Kaempfer (1994)). That is, tariff shocks can be actually viewed as
permanent.
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(25) reveals that the effect on b∗ depends crucially on the relative mag-
nitudes of τθf/pgf and ξ, which capture the following effects on spending,
respectively: (i) a substitution effect, caused by compensated consumption
shifts; and (ii) a welfare effect, due to changes in steady-state welfare given
by (24). A substitution effect is proportionate to initial tariff τ and weakly
positive, whereas the welfare effect can take either sign. When ξ is negative,
a permanent rise in τ improves b∗ and hence the current account. In the case
of a positive ξ, in contrast, the same policy may deteriorate them due to a
negative welfare effect.11
These steady-state effects can be illustrated completely by using the
schedules in figure 1. From the definition of ξ and (6), we have τθf/pgf T ξ as
1/p T θd/θf : whether a substitution effect is stronger or weaker than a wel-
fare effect is shown in the figure by whether the slope of the external balance
line BB0 is larger or smaller than the gradient at the steady-state point of the
steady-state time preference curve RR0. Recall also that the signs of ξ and
hence of a welfare effect are determined by the relative gradients of schedules
RR0 and TT 0 (see section 2.2). We can thus taxonomize the effect of tariffs on
(b∗,φ∗) according to possible orders for the gradients of schedules BB0, RR0,
and TT 0. For example, figure 2 depicts the case in which ξ > τθf/pgf > 0
(i.e., θd/θf(= |gradRR0|) > 1/p(= |gradBB0|) > gd/gf (= |gradTT 0|)). An
increase in τ shifts the FF 0 schedule to the right, thereby bringing the steady-
state point from point E0 to E1. Since point E1 is located below TT 0, φ∗ is
reduced by the tariff change. With schedule BB0 shifting fromE0B0 toB1B01,
b∗ changes from B0 to B1. Point E2, the intersection of the new FF 0-schedule
and the TT 0-curve, represents compensated consumption which generates the
initial utility at point E0. Point B2, therefore, gives net foreign assets which
are required to maintain the initial living standard. The effect on net foreign
assets is composed of a substitution effect, B0 → B2, and a welfare effect,
B2 → B1. In the present case, b∗ and hence the current account deteriorate
due to a dominant negative welfare effect.
11Formally welfare and substitution effects can be defined by using:
φ∗ = u (d∗, f∗) /θ (d∗, f∗) and gf (f
∗,φ∗)
gd (d∗,φ∗)
= p+ τ,
which can be obtained from (12) to (14). From the equations above, consumption and
hence total spending d∗ + pf∗ (of the country) can be solved as functions of p + τ and
φ∗. The effect of p+ τ on the spending function is a substitution effect and that of φ∗ a
welfare effect. For more detailed discussions, see Ikeda (2000a).
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Note that even a marginal tariff from no initial distortion has a first-
order welfare effect whereas there is no first-order substitution effect in the
absence of initial tariffs. This property is in marked contrast to what is
obtained by Razin and Svensson (1983): they show that without initial tar-
iffs there is a first-order substitution effect but no welfare effect. Their result
comes from two critical assumptions. First of all, they assume that subutility
functions are time-varying, for which case a permanent tariff affects the rela-
tive prices of present and future expenditures, changes the real interest rate,
and thereby has a first-order intertemporal substitution effect.12 Secondly,
in their model, intertemporal preferences are assumed to be homothetically,
and hence weakly separable, so that there is no welfare effect. In contrast,
instead of assuming exogenous time-varying subutility functions,13 we have
endogenized a preference-shift by incorporating weakly nonseparable prefer-
ences into a model with a time-invariant instantaneous utility function. This
produces a first-order welfare effect on one hand, and makes a substitution
effect disappear on the other hand.
Notwithstanding the contrast, however, the resultant relationship be-
tween preference-shifting and the current-account effect is fairly consistent
with what Razin and Svensson premise: in both of the models, a permanent,
marginal tariff improves (deteriorates) the current account only when rela-
tive preferences toward imports are, endogenously or exogenously, weakened
(enhanced) in the future (i.e., in the new steady state), in which case a per-
manent rise in consumers’ import prices makes present spending more (less)
expensive in real terms than future one. In this sense, our analysis can be
regarded as a natural dynamic extension of Razin and Svensson (1983).
A remarkable difference of our result from what is obtained in the liter-
ature of dynamic analysis, e.g., Engel and Kletzer (1986) and Mansoorian
(1993), also lies in the presence of steady-state effects on welfare without
initial distortion. Since they assume weakly separable preferences and time
invariant felicity functions, a marginal change in tariffs from zero cannot have
a first-order effect on any economic variables. In the case of weak nonsep-
arability, a demand shift caused by the tariff change can affect steady-state
welfare and the other variables in the first order. This produces two in-
teresting possibilities which cannot be obtained by the previous literature.
12Substitution effects are defined with respect to both intratemporal and intertemporal
relative prices. See Svensson and Razin (1983), p.103.
13To be more precise, Razin and Svensson assume that consumers choose consumption,
taking the time-dependent shift of subutility functions as given, i.e., as an externality.
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First, a rise in tariffs can increase steady-state welfare if preferences toward
exportable-good consumption is more wealth-enhanced than toward imports.
Second, in contrast to the conventional wisdom, the current account can be
worsened if preferences toward imports are sufficiently wealth-enhanced, as
shown in figure 2.
As the final remark, distinguish the effect on welfare φ (0) from that on
steady-state welfare. Tariffs in this model cannot enhance welfare φ (0), even
though they improve steady state welfare if ξ < 0. In fact, (21), (24), and
(25) yield
dφ (0)
dτ =
τg2f
Ψ∆ (p+ τ)2 gff
½
Ψ+ ωθdθf
gdgf
µ
gdd
θdgd
+
gff
θfgf
¶¾
5 0.
With initial distortion, therefore, an increase in tariffs is definitely harmful,
as in other small country models (e.g., Sen and Turnovsky (1989) and Man-
soorian (1993)). Without initial tariffs, a marginal change in tariffs has no
first-order effect on welfare. This is natural since there is no other distor-
tion.14
4 The effect of decreasing impatience
By assuming weak separability, Svensson and Razin (1983) show that (i) in-
creasing (decreasing) impatience is a necessary and sufficient condition for
stability (instability) of the steady state, and that (ii) a permanent terms-
of-trade deterioration worsens (improves) the current account if and only if
impatience is decreasing (increasing) in current welfare. From these discus-
sions, they criticize analyses using the Uzawa-type time-preference model for
their crucial dependence on the assumption of increasing impatience. How
crucially does our result in the previous section depend on the assumption?
To examine this issue, let us next consider the case of decreasing impatience:
θd, θf 5 0 and θd + θf < 0.
14As for initial responses in consumption, from (19) and (21), when db∗/dτ > 0,
domestic-good consumption instantly jumps upward less than in the steady state whereas
foreign-good consumption jumps downward more than in the steady state. In contrast,
when a negative welfare effect is so large that db∗/dτ < 0, the initial upward jump in
d overshoots its long-run increase while the initial discrete fall in f comes short of its
long-run reduction (compare point E01 with E1 in figure 2).
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Let us begin with the case of no initial distortion: τ = 0. From (17), Ψ is
negative under decreasing impatience. From the definition of ω, the smaller
root ω thus takes a positive value.15 It follows that the equilibrium saddle
dynamics are unstable or stable as impatience is decreasing or increasing,16
as in Svensson and Razin’s finding (i).17
The impact effect on current-account b˙ at time zero can be obtained from
(18) as
db˙ (+0)
dτ = −ω
db∗
dτ , (26)
which implies:
sign
db˙ (+0)
dτ = −sign
db∗
dτ = −signξ, (27)
under decreasing impatience, where the last equality comes from (25).
This reveals that, as in the case of increasing impatience (without initial
tariffs), the current-account effect is positive or negative as ξ is negative or
positive. In sum, given the sign of nonseparability index ξ, the sign of the
current-account effect of a permanent increase in tariffs does not depend on
whether impatience is increasing or decreasing, in contrast to the Svensson
and Razin critique: whether consumer preferences toward “present goods”
are more or less wealth-enhanced than toward “future goods,” the current
account will improve (deteriorate) if the preferences toward exports are more
(less) wealth-enhanced than toward imports.
In the presence of initial distortion τ > 0, we obtain from (25)
sign
db˙ (+0)
dτ = sign
µ
τθf
pgf
− ξ
¶
,
implying that, opposite to the case of increasing impatience, a substitution
effect, the first term on the right hand side, affects negatively the current
account under decreasing impatience. When preferences are weakly sepa-
rable, therefore, the sign of the current-account effect depends crucially on
whether impatience is increasing or decreasing, as is criticized by Svensson
15We are maintaining the assumption that gd, gf > 0 and gdd, gff < 0.
16Even when ω is positive, the saddle path satisfies the no-Ponzi-game condition.
17Following Svensson and Razin (1983, pp. 117-118), we neglect the possibility in the
unstable case that the country may get so large to violate the small-country assumption.
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and Razin (1983). This crucial dependence is mitigated under weakly non-
separable preferences since the sign of a welfare effect does not depend on
that property.
5 Concluding remarks
Svensson and Razin emphasize that the current account effects of export-
oriented or import-substitution policies, which alter the internal terms of
trade, depend crucially on policy-induced changes in wealth and interest
rates, rather than on the direct effect of the terms-of-trade change (Svensson
and Razin (1983), pp.100-101). However, they, as well as other authors, basi-
cally assume weakly separable preferences, thereby implicitly assuming away
preference-shifts between exports and imports, caused by “policy-induced
changes in wealth.” It is this channel that we have focused on in this pa-
per. With weakly nonseparable preferences, a permanent rise in tariffs has
a first-order effect on steady-state welfare and thereby on the current ac-
count. To obtain credible prediction about the effects of tariffs, empirical
research about consumers’ preferences is indispensable, especially regarding
how the marginal rate of substitution between exports and imports depends
on current wealth.18
This paper and the companion one (Ikeda, 2000a) imply that weakly
nonseparable preferences have an important implication for optimal wealth
accumulation. For example, suppose that consumers’ preferences toward a
certain good are more wealth-enhanced than the other goods. Then, the
stronger the preferences toward this luxury-type good are, the more wealth
consumers will accumulate. As an interesting application, Ikeda (2000b)
examines how intratemporal preferences toward this kind of luxury goods
indeed affect economic growth and long-run wealth distribution.
Appendix
A Positivity of Ψ
To prove the positivity of Ψ, we first show the following property:
18For empirical implications of weakly nonseparable preferences, see Ikeda (2000a).
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Property A: Under the regularity assumptions given in the text, ξ must
satisfy the following property:
(i) if ξ > 0, then ξ2 < −rθdgff
gdg2f
;
(ii) if ξ < 0, then ξ2 < −rθfgdd
gfg2d
.
Proof. Since ξ < θd
gd
by the definition of ξ and the positivity of gf , we have
ξ < θd
gd
. It follows that when ξ > 0, we have
ξ2 < θd
gd
ξ < −θd
gd
θgff
g2f
,
where the second inequality comes from the third inequality in (3). In the
same way the second relation can be proven by using the property that ξ > θf
gf
even if ξ < 0 and (3).
From (i) in property A, when ξ > 0, the definition of Ψ implies
Ψ > rθdgff
gdg2f
− rθdθf
gdgf
µ
gdd
θdgd
+
gff
θfgf
¶
= −rθfgdd
g2dgf
> 0.
Similarly when ξ < 0, it should hold valid that
Ψ > rθfgdd
g2dgf
− rθdθf
gdgf
µ
gdd
θdgd
+
gff
θfgf
¶
= −rθdgff
gdg2f
> 0.
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